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The Road to Fourth Amendment Erosion is Paved 
with Good Intentions: Examining Why Florida Should 
Limit the Community Caretaker Exception 
Matthew C. Shapiro∗ 
I.  INTRODUCTION  
If a well-intentioned police officer is performing acts unrelated to 
criminal activity, should he be allowed to enter your home without a 
warrant?  The setting is the small town of Mayberry, North Carolina, 
and the time is 6:30 in the evening.  Sheriff Andy Griffith has just 
stepped into the police station when he receives a call from Main 
Street Elementary School stating that local gas station attendant, 
Gomer Pyle, never picked up his son.  Because the school is unable to 
contact Mr. Pyle, Sheriff Griffith proceeds to drive the six-year-old 
child home.  In the past, Griffith, a well-meaning and affable officer, 
has been known to perform many duties within the town that are 
completely removed from his role as a crime-fighter.  At the moment, 
he seeks to perform yet another task unrelated to combating criminal 
activity by reuniting a child with his absent-minded father.  Even 
though the Pyle residence appears to be empty, and there are no signs 
of an emergency, Sheriff Griffith enters the home.  Once inside, the 
sheriff discovers drugs and arrests Mr. Pyle when he returns home 
slightly thereafter.  Was Andy Griffith’s entrance into the home a 
search that would ordinarily be illegal under the Fourth Amendment?  
If so, should his actions be excused based on our society’s need to 
have police officers involved in protective actions that go beyond tra-
ditional notions of law enforcement duties?   
Fundamental to our system of government is the idea that free-
dom from unreasonable searches and seizures is an enumerated pro-
tection guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment.  At the essence of this 
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amendment stands the ideal that “a man’s home is his castle,” and 
thus, it enjoys a stringent safeguarding from government intrusion.1  
Nevertheless, the right to be free from unreasonable searches and sei-
zures, as well as the need for privacy, are constantly being balanced 
against another important interest – the desire to have police officers 
not only protect us from crime, but also to provide what have come to 
be known as community caretaking functions.2   
The ability of police officers to perform warrantless searches, 
while acting as a caretaker, is relatively settled: as long as police are 
acting in a role divorced from that of a crime-fighter, a warrantless 
search of an automobile or other form of transportation is constitu-
tional.3  The issue dividing jurisdictions is whether the community 
caretaker exception should extend into the home.  In light of the re-
cent Florida case of Ortiz v. State, this comment will argue that the 
community caretaker doctrine was never intended to apply to war-
rantless searches of homes, and that if allowed to do so, the State risks 
unnecessary curtailment of citizens’ Fourth Amendment rights.4  As 
such, Florida courts must continue to steadfastly recognize the United 
States Supreme Court’s decision to limit the scope of the community 
caretaker doctrine.5  
The community caretaker exception was first introduced in Cady 
v. Dombrowski.6  There, the Supreme Court officially recognized that 
                                                                                                                           
 1 Wilson v. Layne, 141 F.3d 111, 132 (4th Cir. 1998) (stating that the fundamental principle 
behind the Fourth Amendment is that a man’s home is his castle); see also ROBERT M. BLOOM, 
SEARCHES, SEIZURES, AND WARRANTS 49 (2003).  
 2 Today, “[a] police officer is a ‘jack-of-all-emergencies.’”  United States v. Rodriguez-
Morales, 929 F.2d 780, 784-85 (1st Cir. 1991).  “[He] is expected to aid those in distress, combat 
actual hazards . . . and provide an infinite variety of services to preserve and protect community 
safety.”  Id. at 784-85. 
 3 See, e.g., Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 447-48 (1973); Ray v. Township of Warren, 
626 F.3d 170, 174-75 (3d Cir. 2010); United States v. Erikson, 991 F.2d 529, 531 (9th Cir. 1993); 
State v. Gill, 755 N.W.2d 454, 458 (N.D. 2008); Riggs v. State, 918 So. 2d 274, 280 n.1 (Fla. 2005); 
Wood v. Commonwealth, 497 S.E.2d 484, 486-87 (Va. Ct. App. 1998); State v. Alexander, 721 A.2d 
275, 279-80 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1998); People v. Davis, 497 N.W.2d 910, 913-14 (Mich. 1993). 
 4 Even though the community caretaker exception does not lend itself to a visualization 
of police officers combing through bedroom drawers in order to obtain evidence of a crime, a 
search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment is nevertheless taking place.  Whenever the 
government violates a subjective expectation of privacy that society recognizes as reasonable, a 
search has occurred.  See Twilegar v. State, 42 So. 3d 177, 193 (Fla. 2010).  
 5 The Florida Constitution requires that courts construe search and seizure issues in ac-
cordance with the United States Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Fourth Amendment: 
“The right of the people to be secure in their . . . houses . . . against unreasonable searches and 
seizures . . . shall not be violated . . . . This right shall be construed in conformity with the 4th 
Amendment to the United States Constitution, as interpreted by the United States Supreme 
Court.”  FLA. CONST. art. I, § 12 (emphasis added); see also Cady, 413 U.S. at 439 (noting the 
constitutional difference between house and car). 
 6 413 U.S. 433 (1973). 
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police officers provide certain community caretaking functions that 
are “totally divorced from the detection, investigation, or acquisition 
of evidence relating to the violation of a criminal statute.”7  After iden-
tifying a difference in privacy expectations between motor vehicles 
and dwelling places, the Court concluded that certain types of caretak-
ing searches were not unreasonable, and thus, a warrant was unneces-
sary for their undertaking.8  From this premise arose the community 
caretaker exception. 
In the time since Cady, courts have been inconsistent in their in-
terpretation of the community caretaker doctrine.  While some deci-
sions have steadfastly recognized that the caretaker exception applies 
only to vehicles,9 other courts have expanded the doctrine to allow 
warrantless searches within the home.10  Many of these expansionist 
courts are merely confusing Cady with already-existing Fourth 
Amendment exceptions by labeling them all under the broad heading 
of “community caretaking functions.”11  As each Fourth Amendment 
exception has its own carefully-delineated justifications, standards, or 
even lack thereof, this is a dangerous practice.   
                                                                                                                           
 7 Id. at 441. 
 8 Id. at 439.  “Although vehicles are ‘effects’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amend-
ment, ‘for the purposes of the Fourth Amendment there is a constitutional difference between 
houses and cars.’”  Id. (quoting Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 52 (1970)).  Specifically, be-
cause of the frequency with which vehicles become disabled or are involved in accidents, police 
contact with them is substantially greater than contact with a home.  Id. at 440-41. 
 9 See, e.g., United States v. Erikson, 991 F.2d 529, 531 (9th Cir. 1993); United States v. 
Pichany, 687 F.2d 204, 208 (7th Cir. 1982); State v. Gill, 755 N.W.2d 454, 459-60 (N.D. 2008); Riggs 
v. State, 918 So. 2d 274, 279 (Fla. 2005); Wood v. Commonwealth, 497 S.E.2d 484, 487 (Va. Ct. App. 
1998); People v. Davis, 497 N.W.2d 910, 914-15 (Mich. 1993). 
 10 See, e.g., United States v. Nord, 586 F.2d 1288, 1290-91 (8th Cir. 1978) (affirming the right 
of the police to be on the premises as part of routine community caretaking functions); United 
States v. Rohrig, 98 F.3d 1506, 1522 (6th Cir. 1996) (allowing warrantless entry of a home to quell 
loud music); People v. Ray, 981 P.2d 928, 934-35 (Cal. 1999) (finding that a warrantless search was 
justified under community caretaking exception); Troy v. Ohlinger, 475 N.W.2d 54, 57-58 (Mich. 
1991) (holding that an officer was justified to enter residence as part of community caretaker 
function). 
 11 Although there are many established exceptions to the warrant requirement, this com-
ment will solely focus on two aside from the community caretaker doctrine.  First, there is the 
exigent circumstances exception, which applies when police are searching for evidence or perpe-
trators of a crime.  See discussion infra Part II.B; Riggs, 918 So. 2d at 278; Arango v. State, 411 So. 
2d 172, 174 (Fla. 1982).  When invoking the exigent circumstance exception, the government 
must demonstrate a grave emergency whereby there is not time to secure a warrant.  Ray, 981 
P.2d at 933.  Second, the emergency aid exception grants police entrance to a residence to pre-
serve life or render first aid, provided there is no intent to arrest or search.  See discussion infra 
Part II.C.; Riggs, 918 So. 2d at 280 (citing Hornblower v. State, 351 So. 2d 716 (Fla. 1977)); see also 
Ray, 981 P.2d at 934 (advancing the idea that not all “caretaker” functions should be judged by 
same standard). 
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The Fourth Amendment was created based on a societal expecta-
tion of privacy within our dwellings.12  In fact, physical entry of the 
home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth 
Amendment is directed.13  To permit police officers to enter a resi-
dence, when they are acting solely within their community caretaker 
roles, would be to create yet another exception and thus risk having it 
envelope the general rule.14  As Justice Scalia once stated, “the ‘war-
rant’ requirement [has] become so riddled with exceptions that it [is] 
basically unrecognizable.”15  Following the ongoing debate as to the 
scope of the community caretaker doctrine in Ortiz v. State, it is im-
portant that Florida courts definitively recognize that the doctrine 
does not and should not extend to warrantless searches of the home.16  
Firmly rooted exceptions, with clear-cut standards, already exist to aid 
law enforcement officers in perceived emergency situations.17   
Part II of this comment provides a historical understanding of the 
principles behind the Fourth Amendment and addresses various rec-
ognized exceptions that have impacted courts’ applications of Cady.  
Part III affirms that community caretaker searches, despite being de-
void of any criminal activity, do invoke Fourth Amendment protec-
tions.  Part IV surveys various jurisdictions’ interpretations of Cady, 
placing emphasis on how confusion of already-existing doctrines, 
along with disregard for the express language in Cady, has largely 
been the cause of unnecessary expansion.  Part V examines Florida’s 
historical approach to the doctrine and analyzes why the recent deci-
sion in Ortiz v. State should have been decided solely on the basis of 
the emergency aid doctrine.  Finally, Part VI considers the dangers 
posed by applying the Cady doctrine to dwellings and suggests that 
Florida courts steadfastly and expressly limit this Fourth Amendment 
exception to vehicles.   
II.  THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND ITS EXCEPTIONS 
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution grants:  
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, pa-
pers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall 
                                                                                                                           
 12 See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 585 (1980). 
 13 Id. at 586-87. 
 14 Ray, 981 P.2d at 941 (Mosk, J., dissenting) (“[S]uch an exception threatens to swallow the 
rule that absent a showing of true necessity, the . . . right to security and privacy in one's home 
must prevail.”). 
 15 BLOOM, supra note 1, at 102.  
 16 See generally Ortiz v. State, 24 So. 3d 596 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2009) (en banc) (debat-
ing the proper scope of community caretaker exception), appeal denied, 37 So. 3d 848 (Fla. 2010).   
 17 See discussion infra Parts II.B-II.C. 
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not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable 
cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describ-
ing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be 
seized.18   
To comprehend the meaning behind this text, as well as fully under-
stand why protection of the home is the crux of the Fourth Amend-
ment, it is important to first grasp the historical developments that 
brought about its creation.  By understanding its history, one can bet-
ter evaluate the development of the amendment through judicial con-
struction.19 
The sanctity of one’s home has long been considered a tenet of 
British liberty.20  William Pitt, a British politician in the late eighteenth 
and early nineteenth centuries, expressed this sentiment unequivo-
cally: “The poorest man may, in his cottage, bid defiance to all the 
forces of the Crown.  It may be frail; its roof may shake . . . the rain 
may enter; but the King of England may not[.]”21  During America’s 
Revolutionary Period, colonists continued to support this ideal by 
expressing their grievances over the enforcement of tax laws by 
searches that were conducted absent evidence of wrongdoing.22  Sub-
sequent to the colonies declaring their independence, several states 
adopted constitutional safeguards regulating searches.23     
Following the conclusion of the war and a brief period of govern-
ance under the Articles of Confederation, it became apparent that a 
stronger form of centralized government was necessary.24  Throughout 
the debates over whether to ratify the proposed Constitution, Anti-
Federalists argued strongly against the prospective government having 
the power to conduct general searches.25  Richard Henry Lee, a promi-
nent member of Congress, and a well-known Anti-Federalist, de-
scribed protection from search and seizure as a right that, if not guar-
anteed, would be fatal to ratification.26  Based on the need to achieve a 
                                                                                                                           
 18 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 19 JACOB W. LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME COURT:  A STUDY IN 
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 19 (1966). 
 20 Id. at 19-20. 
 21 Id. at 25. 
 22 ANDREW E. TASLITZ, RECONSTRUCTING THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: A HISTORY OF 
SEARCH AND SEIZURE, 1789- 1868 (2006). 
 23 LANDYNSKI, supra note 19, at 38. 
 24 Primary Documents in American History, the Articles of Confederation, 
http://www.loc.gov/rr/program/bib/ourdocs/articles.html (last visited Nov. 6, 2011). 
 25 TASLITZ, supra note 22, at 43. 
 26 Id.  Although they eventually ratified the Constitution, Virginia’s convention recom-
mended that the first Congress include a passage “that every free person be ‘secure from all 
unreasonable searches and seizures’ and that warrants be based on ‘legal and sufficient cause.’”  
Id.  
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compromise between the Federalist and Anti-Federalist factions, 
James Madison proposed the Bill of Rights – a series of articles pro-
tecting what were considered the basic principles of liberty.27  Included 
in this draft proposal was what would become the Fourth Amendment 
to the United States Constitution.28 
The relationship between the two Fourth Amendment clauses is 
unambiguous.  The first clause, granting people the right to be free 
from unreasonable searches and seizures, stated the entitlement to be 
free from arbitrary governmental invasion.29  In addition, it empha-
sized the requirements for a valid search.30  The second clause inter-
preted the first by stating what kind of search was reasonable: a search 
carried out under the requirements stated in the Fourth Amendment.31 
Today, protection of personal privacy expectations against unwar-
ranted intrusion by the State remains the key function of the Fourth 
Amendment.32  Specifically, “physical entry of the home is the chief 
evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is di-
rected.”33  As is crucial to understanding why the holding in Cady must 
be limited to automobiles, of all the zones of privacy expectation, 
“[t]he home enjoys the strongest expectation of privacy and maximum 
Fourth Amendment protection.  This stems from the intent of the 
Framers to ensure the sanctity of the home from invasion by the gov-
ernment.”34  However, it is also important to note that not all expecta-
tions of privacy receive the same degree of protection.  “Whether an 
expectation of privacy is reasonable often depends on the physical 
setting involved.”35  The farther one moves from the boundaries of the 
home, the less the expectation of privacy is present.36  The idea that 
privacy expectations vary based upon physical location is reflected in 
the way the Court succinctly differentiates between the automobile 
and the home in Cady.37 
                                                                                                                           
 27 Exploring Constitutional Conflicts, the Bill of Rights: Its History and Significance, 
http://law2.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/conlaw/billofrightsintro.html (last visited Nov. 6, 
2011).  
 28 See id. 
 29 LANDYNSKI, supra note 19, at 43. 
 30 Id.  
 31 Id. 
 32 Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966) (recognizing that the overriding func-
tion of the Fourth Amendment is to protect personal privacy against intrusion). 
 33 Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 585 (1980). 
 34 BLOOM, supra note 1, at 49. 
 35 Id. 
 36 Id.   
 37 See Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 440 (1973).  “We made it clear in Preston that 
whether a search . . . is unreasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment depends 
upon the facts and circumstances of each case and pointed out . . . that searches of cars that are 
constantly moveable may make the search of a car without a warrant a reasonable one although 
 
2011] The Road to Fourth Amendment Erosion 357 
Despite stringent constitutional protection when it comes to the 
domestic threshold, the Court has made it clear that the Fourth 
Amendment does not prohibit all warrantless searches; some searches 
may be deemed reasonable based on the totality of the circum-
stances.38  In determining whether a warrantless search is reasonable, 
courts must balance two important factors: (1) an individual’s Fourth 
Amendment interest to be free, and (2) the search’s promotion of a 
legitimate governmental interest.39  Keeping this crucial balance in 
mind, the Supreme Court has chosen to delineate certain exceptions 
to the presumption that a warrantless search is unreasonable.  A firm 
understanding of these exceptions will elucidate how courts are inter-
changing established doctrines; the end result being the wrongful ex-
tension of the community caretaker exception.   
A. The Community Caretaker Doctrine – Cady v. Dombrowski 
In Cady v. Dombrowski, the Supreme Court recognized that po-
lice officers frequently perform functions that are unrelated to their 
role as crime-fighters.40  These duties, undertaken with a concern for 
the general safety of the public, are often grouped under the descrip-
tion of community caretaking functions.41  “Caretaking functions are 
performed by police officers because we expect them to take those 
steps that are necessary to ‘ensure the safety and welfare of the citi-
zenry at large.’”42 
In Cady, an off-duty, intoxicated Illinois police officer crashed his 
rental car while in Wisconsin.43  Acting under the belief that Chicago 
police were required to carry their service revolvers at all times, and 
not having found a revolver on Cady’s person, Wisconsin police offi-
cers looked into the car’s front seat and glove compartment for the 
weapon.44  No revolver was found and the car was towed to a pri-
vately-owned garage.45  After being formally arrested for drunk driv-
                                                                                                                           
the result might be opposite in a search of a home . . . or other fixed location.” (emphasis added) 
(citing Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 366-67 (1964)). 
 38 See Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39 (1996). 
 39 People v. Bennett, 949 P.2d 947, 944 (Cal. 1998) (citing United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 
109, 113 (1984)). 
 40 Cady, 413 U.S. at 441. 
 41 Id.  
 42 Ortiz v. State, 24 So. 3d 596, 600 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2009) (quoting 3 LAFAVE, 
SEARCH & SEIZURE § 5.4(c), at 201-02 (4th ed. 2004)). 
 43 Cady, 413 U.S. at 435-36. 
 44 Id. at 436. 
 45 Id. 
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ing, the respondent was taken to a local hospital where he lapsed into 
a coma and was hospitalized overnight for observation.46 
While one of the Wisconsin policemen remained at the hospital, 
the other returned to the garage where the car had been stored in or-
der to further search for the respondent’s revolver.47  Upon opening 
the car door, the officer found a flashlight that “appeared to have ‘a 
few spots of blood on it.’”48  The officer then opened the locked trunk 
and discovered various items covered in blood.49  Upon receiving addi-
tional information from the respondent, a body was located on a farm 
in a nearby county.50  After a habeas corpus petition was denied by the 
federal district court, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sev-
enth Circuit reversed, holding that the search of the trunk had been 
unconstitutional.51 
On appeal, the Supreme Court began its analysis with the firmly-
rooted assumption that “a search of private property without proper 
consent is ‘unreasonable’ unless . . . authorized by a valid search war-
rant.”52  The decision further stated, “[a]lthough vehicles are ‘effects’ 
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment . . . there is a constitu-
tional difference between houses and cars.”53  “[The difference] stems 
both from the ambulatory character of the [car] and from the fact that 
extensive . . . noncriminal contact with automobiles will bring local 
officials in ‘plain view’ of evidence[.]”54  Justice Brennan stated that 
“because of . . . the frequency with which a vehicle can become dis-
abled or involved in an accident . . . [police] contact with automobiles 
will be substantially greater than . . . contact in a home or office.”55  
This noted distinction is of considerable importance given that when 
courts expand the community caretaker doctrine into the domestic 
realm, they are applying a baseline standard of reasonableness rather 
than considering the enhanced protection that a home is supposedly 
afforded.56  This interchangeability was never intended by the Court.  
                                                                                                                           
 46 Id. 
 47 Id. at 436-37.  Officer Weiss stated that the effort to find the revolver was “standard 
procedure” in the department.  Id. at 437. 
 48 Id. at 437. 
 49 Id. 
 50 Id. at 437-38. 
 51 Dombrowski v. Cady, 471 F.2d 280, 286 (7th Cir. 1972) (holding that the search could not 
be upheld on the basis of the “plain view” doctrine). 
 52 Cady, 413 U.S. at 439 (citing Camara v. Mun. Court of S.F., 387 U.S. 523, 528-29 (1967)).  
 53 Id. (emphasis added) (citing Chambers v. Maroney, 299 U.S. 42, 52 (1970)). 
 54 Id. at 442. 
 55 Id. at 441. 
 56 See, e.g., United States v. McGough, 412 F.3d 1232, 1236-37 (11th Cir. 2005); Laney v. 
State, 117 S.W.3d 854, 861 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003); People v. Ray, 981 P.2d 928, 933 (Cal. 1999); 
State v. Alexander, 721 A.2d 275, 279 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1998). 
2011] The Road to Fourth Amendment Erosion 359 
In determining that the search of the trunk was not unreasonable 
under the Fourth Amendment, the Court placed emphasis on the fact 
that the officer was justifiably acting based on concern for the safety 
of the public:  
Local police officers . . . frequently investigate vehicle accidents 
in which there is no claim of criminal liability and engage in what 
. . . may be described as community caretaker functions, totally di-
vorced from the detection, investigation, or acquisition of evi-
dence relating to the violation of a criminal statute.57 
In the Court’s opinion, although the officer had not obtained a war-
rant before searching the vehicle, his intrusion was nevertheless rea-
sonable in order to protect the safety of the public should the gun 
have been removed from the vehicle.58  The judgment of the Court of 
Appeals was reversed.59   
Unfortunately, Cady neither thoroughly discussed the standard of 
suspicion necessary for police to execute a search when performing 
caretaker functions, nor did it expressly state the extent to which the 
home would be protected.  Instead, the Court merely implied that the 
standard necessary to invoke the community caretaker exception was 
that of reasonableness:60  “Given the known facts, would a prudent and 
reasonable officer have perceived a need to act in the proper dis-
charge of his or her community caretaking functions?”61  Granted, the 
ultimate standard set forth in the Fourth Amendment is reasonable-
ness.62  Nevertheless, there remains a general agreement that, unless a 
carefully-defined exception applies, a search of private property is 
unreasonable absent a valid search warrant.63   
Naturally, the question then becomes, is the community caretaker 
exception carefully defined to the point such that a valid search war-
rant is unnecessary?  As far as the Court is concerned, when it comes 
to automobile searches, based upon the expectation of privacy associ-
ated with them, reasonableness is generally a satisfactory standard.64  
The problem with allowing “reasonableness” to also serve as a general 
                                                                                                                           
 57 Cady, 413 U.S. at 441 (emphasis added). 
 58 Id. at 447-48. 
 59 Id. at 450. 
 60 Id. at 439. 
 61 Matthew Bell, Fourth Amendment Reasonableness: Why Utah Courts Should Embrace 
the Community Caretaking Exception to the Warrant Requirement, 10 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 3, 3 
(2005) (quoting People v. Ray, 981 P.2d 928, 937 (Cal. 1999)). 
 62 Cady, 413 U.S. at 439. 
 63 Camara v. Mun. Court of S.F., 387 U.S. 523, 528-29 (1967) (stating that a search of private 
property is generally unreasonable absent a search warrant). 
 64 Cady, 413 U.S. at 439-40 (citing Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 366-67 (1964)). 
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standard for warrantless home searches is that almost any time an 
officer is performing a function devoid of crime-fighting intent, they 
would have free reign to enter ones’ dwelling absent a warrant.  Fur-
thermore, what is “reasonable” is a matter of opinion that will differ 
from one person to the next.  This vast, all-encompassing, loosely-
defined standard in no way harmonizes with the imbedded ideal that 
invasion of the home is the “chief evil” against which the Fourth 
Amendment protection was designed.65 
B. Exigent Circumstances 
Another well-established warrantless search exception exists for 
emergencies or dangerous situations known as “exigent circum-
stances.”66  “Where safety is threatened and time is of the essence . . . 
the need to protect life and to prevent serious bodily injury provides 
justification for an otherwise invalid entry.”67  An important distinction 
between the caretaker and exigent circumstance exceptions is that the 
latter applies when the police are acting in their crime-fighting roles.68  
When the government invokes the exigent circumstances exception, 
the entrenched presumption that warrantless entry of a home is un-
reasonable must be rebutted.69  In order to do so, the government must 
demonstrate a “‘grave emergency’ that ‘makes a warrantless search 
imperative to the safety of the police and the community.’”70  In addi-
tion, the officer must have acted on probable cause, and in good faith, 
based on the totality of the circumstances.71  Any exigencies support-
ing a warrantless entry must be known by the police prior to entry of 
the premises.72  
As the Florida Supreme Court has noted, the situations under 
which exigent circumstances have been applied are “few in number 
                                                                                                                           
 65 Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 585 (1980). 
 66 Riggs v. State, 918 So. 2d 274, 278 (Fla. 2005) (recognizing that a warrant is not required 
when “exigent circumstances” are present).  
 67 Id. (quoting Arango v. State, 411 So. 2d 172, 174 (Fla. 1982)). 
 68 Laney v. State, 117 S.W.3d 854, 861 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003).  Compare Welsh v. Wisconsin, 
466 U.S. 740, 748-54 (1984) (finding where officers entered the appellant’s residence and arrested 
him after receiving information that he was driving under the influence, no exigent circum-
stances existed), with Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 392 (1978) (introducing the emergency aid 
doctrine and holding it to apply when the police are acting to protect or preserve life). 
 69 See Welsh, 466 U.S. at 750. 
 70 Riggs, 918 So. 2d at 278 (citing Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 191 (1990)). 
 71 Seibert v. State, 923 So. 2d 460, 468 (Fla. 2006) (stating that whether exigent circum-
stances are present is evaluated based on totality of circumstance); see State v. Wakeford, 953 
P.2d 1065, 1069 (Mont. 1998) (articulating probable cause and good faith as exigent circumstance 
requirements). 
 72 United States v. Warner, 843 F.2d 401, 403 (9th Cir. 1988). 
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and carefully delineated.”73  Included among the recognized uses of 
exigent circumstances is the pursuit of a fleeing felon, the prevention 
of evidence destruction, and searches incident to lawful arrest.74  Fed-
eral courts have characterized exigent circumstances as existing within 
four general categories: (1) hot pursuit of a fleeing felon; (2) imminent 
destruction of evidence; (3) the need to prevent a suspect’s escape; 
and (4) a risk of danger to the police or to others.75  Although the 
United States Supreme Court has had the opportunity to broaden this 
exception, it has “steadfastly declined this invitation:” 
Our rejection of such claims is not due to a lack of appreciation 
of the difficulty and importance of effective law enforcement, but 
rather to our firm commitment to “the view of those who wrote 
the Bill of Rights that the privacy of a person’s home . . . may not 
be totally sacrificed in the name of maximum simplicity in en-
forcement of the criminal law.”76 
From a policy standpoint, the exigent circumstance exception 
stands as recognition that, as a practical concern, a warrant is not al-
ways able to be secured in time for police officers to carry out their 
crime-fighting duties in an emergency.77  Criminal investigation often 
demands immediate action.  Even though the exigent circumstances 
exception serves to override the need to obtain a warrant, it remains 
steadfastly limited in its application and should always satisfy the 
aforementioned carefully-delineated standards. 
C. Emergency Aid Doctrine 
Of the three Fourth Amendment exceptions discussed in this 
comment, the emergency aid doctrine presents the greatest challenge 
when it comes to proper categorization.  Under this exception, police 
may enter a residence without a warrant when the purpose of the en-
try is to provide immediate medical aid or assistance.78  Most impor-
                                                                                                                           
 73 Riggs, 918 So. 2d at 279. 
 74 Id. at 278-79 (citing Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298-99 (1967) (holding that the 
police acted reasonably upon entering a house to search for a man described as being involved in 
an armed robbery); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770-71 (1966) (stating the officer might 
reasonably have believed he was confronted with an emergency when the delay necessary to 
obtain a warrant threatened destruction of evidence); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-63 
(1969) (holding there was reasonableness of the officer in searching the arrested person to re-
move possible weapons). 
 75 United States v. Rohrig, 98 F.3d 1506, 1515 (6th Cir. 1996). 
 76 Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 192 (1990) (quoting Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 
393 (1978)). 
 77 See BLOOM, supra note 1, at 102. 
 78 Commonwealth v. Snell, 705 N.E.2d 236, 242 (Mass. 1999).  
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tantly, the impetus for entry may not be related to gathering evidence 
of criminal activity.79  In determining whether a search was justified 
under the emergency aid exception, most courts have looked to the 
objective reasonableness of the officer’s belief in the existence of a 
medical emergency.80  Moreover, a search under this exception will 
only be upheld to the extent that it was necessary to resolve the emer-
gency situation.81   
Historically, the exception was first officially discussed in Mincey 
v. Arizona.82  In this case, during a narcotics raid, an undercover police 
officer was shot and killed.83  Shortly thereafter, homicide detectives 
arrived on the scene and conducted a four-day warrantless search of 
the petitioner’s apartment.84  After being convicted of murder, the pe-
titioner argued that the evidence from the warrantless search should 
not have been admitted.85  In response, the State contended that a 
categorical exception to the warrant requirement existed since a pos-
sible homicide presents an emergency situation demanding immediate 
action.86  Although the Court rejected this line of reasoning,87 it did 
officially recognize the rendering of emergency aid as a Fourth 
Amendment exception:   
We do not question the right of the police to respond to emer-
gency situations.  Numerous state and federal cases have recog-
nized that the Fourth Amendment does not bar police officers 
from making warrantless entries and searches when they rea-
sonably believe that a person within is in need of immediate aid.88 
The creation of the emergency aid exception serves as recognition 
that the preservation of life and the rendering of emergency aid are 
imperative enough to circumvent the requirement of a warrant.89  Sim-
                                                                                                                           
 79 Id.    
 80 See, e.g., Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006); Riggs v. State, 918 So. 2d 274, 
278-79 (Fla. 2005); Ortiz v. State, 24 So. 3d 596, 603 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2009). 
 81 BLOOM, supra note 1, at 104. 
 82 Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978). 
 83 Id. at 387. 
 84 Id. at 389. 
 85 Id. 
 86 Id. at 392.  The State also argued that the search of the petitioner’s apartment did not 
invade any constitutionally protected right of privacy since, by shooting an officer, Mincey for-
feited any reasonable expectation of privacy in the apartment.  Id. at 391.  This contention was 
rejection by the Court.  Id. at 391-92. 
 87 Id. “[A] four-day search that included opening dresser drawers and ripping up carpets 
can hardly be rationalized in terms of the legitimate concerns that justify an emergency search.” 
Id. at 393.  
 88 Id. (emphasis added). 
 89 Mary Elisabeth Naumann, The Community Caretaker Doctrine: Yet Another Fourth 
Amendment Exception, 26 AM. J. CRIM. L. 325, 331 (1999). 
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ilar to a scenario involving exigent circumstances, the need for haste 
serves to justify a decrease in privacy rights: “[s]ince emergency aid 
presents a greater urgency than other caretaking functions, courts 
generally permit a greater degree of intrusion upon privacy . . . .”90  
Even so, courts still require that the previously-referenced standards 
be fulfilled in order for the warrantless search to be upheld.91   
Because the Supreme Court did not outright recognize an “emer-
gency aid exception,” but rather mentioned it in its dicta, subsequent 
application has been inconsistent.92  The Florida Supreme Court, 
unlike the United States Supreme Court, has addressed the issue sev-
eral times and has upheld warrantless entries motivated by feared 
medical emergencies.93  Given that the emergency aid doctrine and the 
exigent circumstances exception both involve emergencies requiring 
immediate action, courts have often used them interchangeably.94  Fur-
thermore, because rendering aid in a medical emergency is a type of 
caretaking function devoid of criminal purpose, courts have also cate-
gorized the emergency aid doctrine as a subcategory of the commu-
nity caretaker doctrine.95  However, the exceptions are not inter-
changeable due to their different purposes.96  Since the emergency aid 
doctrine requires that a search be devoid of any criminal investiga-
tion,97 officers performing warrantless searches that are related to 
criminal activity must justify their actions using exigent circum-
stances.98  Although similar, the two doctrines are not identical due to 
a narrow distinction:99 
                                                                                                                           
 90 Bell, supra note 61, at 20. 
 91 See supra notes 78-81 and accompanying text. 
 92 Riggs v. State, 918 So. 2d 274, 279 (Fla. 2005). 
 93 Id. at 280. 
 94 Naumann, supra note 89, at 332 (citing State v. Jones, 947 P.2d 1030, 1036-37 (Kan. Ct. 
App. 1997)).  
 95 Id. at 330.  It can be argued that the community caretaker doctrine is broad and actually 
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the automobile impoundment doctrine; and (3) the public servant exception.  Id.  The common 
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See People v. Ray, 981 P.2d 928, 933 (Cal. 1999) (holding that the emergency aid doctrine is a sub-
category of community caretaker doctrine); Naumann, supra note 89, at 330.  For the purposes of 
this comment, the term “community caretaker doctrine” will be used to refer to what some juris-
dictions would label as the “public servant” exception.  See Naumann, supra note 89, at 338. 
 96 Id. at 332. 
 97 “The ‘emergency exception’ permits police to enter and investigate private premises to 
preserve life . . . or to render first aid, provided they do not enter with an accompanying intent to 
arrest or search.”  Riggs, 918 So. 2d at 280; see also Commonwealth v. Snell, 705 N.E.2d 236, 243 
(Mass. 1999). 
 98 Naumann, supra note 89, at 332-33. 
 99 Laney v. State, 117 S.W.3d 854, 861 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (noting difference between 
emergency doctrine and community caretaker doctrine). 
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Under the emergency doctrine, the officer has an immediate, rea-
sonable belief that he or she must act to “protect or preserve life 
or avoid serious injury.”  On the other hand, under the Cady doc-
trine, the officer “might or might not believe there is a difficulty 
requiring his general assistance.”  Therefore, while both doctrines 
are based on an officer’s reasonable belief in the need to act pur-
suant to his or her “community caretaking functions,” the emer-
gency doctrine is limited to the functions of protecting or pre-
serving life or avoiding serious injury.100 
III.  COMMUNITY CARETAKER FUNCTIONS TRIGGER FOURTH 
AMENDMENT PROTECTION 
Courts have often had difficulty determining whether the com-
munity caretaking doctrine involves searches that garner judicial at-
tention under the Fourth Amendment.101  As Judge Torpy expressed in 
Ortiz v. State, the purpose of a search warrant is to ensure that conclu-
sions as to probable cause are drawn.102  Since probable cause is a con-
cept that is confined to criminal investigations, it could be argued that 
a warrant would be unnecessary when police are performing functions 
totally devoid from the detection of crime.103  This issue, as it relates to 
the community caretaker analysis, is important in that “[i]f courts do 
not classify caretaker encounters . . . as searches, [such] encounters 
[will] not invoke Fourth Amendment considerations that require an 
evaluation of the actions . . . .”104   
Courts that believe warrants are inapplicable during community 
caretaking searches are misguided in two aspects: first, the Fourth 
Amendment’s protections are not limited to police searches,105 and 
second, “the Fourth Amendment applies even if the conduct falls short 
of a ‘full-blown search.’”106  The Supreme Court has held that it would 
be “anomalous to say that the individual and his private property are 
fully protected by the Fourth Amendment only when the individual is 
suspected of criminal behavior.”107  The Fourth Amendment also regu-
lates the conduct of fire marshals, building inspectors, and those whose 
“purpose may be to locate and abate a suspected public nuisance, or 
                                                                                                                           
 100 Id.  
 101 Naumann, supra note 89, at 342. 
 102 Ortiz v. State, 24 So. 3d 596, 604 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2009) (Torpy, J., concurring) 
(citing South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 371 (1976)). 
 103 Id. at 604. 
 104 Naumann, supra note 89, at 342. 
 105 Camara v. Mun. Court of S.F., 387 U.S. 523, 530 (1967). 
 106 Naumann, supra note 89, at 342 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968)). 
 107 Camara, 387 U.S. at 530. 
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simply to perform a routine periodic inspection.”108  If the Fourth 
Amendment applies to searches that are completely unrelated to 
criminal investigation, it would only stand to reason that it also applies 
when police officers are performing a search under their role as com-
munity caretakers.  In addition, a “search occurs when an expectation 
of privacy that society is prepared to consider reasonable is in-
fringed.”109  Considering a person enjoys the highest expectation of 
privacy in their home, it would be reasonable to say that a search oc-
curs when police enter a home, even if only to perform community 
caretaking functions.110   
IV.  EXPANSION AND RESTRICTION OF THE COMMUNITY CARETAKER 
EXCEPTION IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS 
Outside of Florida, federal and state courts have varied on 
whether to enlarge the caretaker doctrine.  In jurisdictions where rul-
ings have extended Cady so as to encompass domestic searches, courts 
have erred in two aspects.  First, they have often justified their hold-
ings by either mistakenly using exigent circumstance or emergency aid 
rationale labeled under the heading of a community caretaking func-
tion, or in other instances, have failed to apply an already-existing ex-
ception whose carefully-delineated standards offer greater Fourth 
Amendment protection.111  Second, they have disregarded the express 
language in Cady that distinguished the privacy interests between au-
tomobiles and homes.112   
One example of confusion among doctrines can be found in Peo-
ple v. Ray.113  In that matter, the Supreme Court of California upheld a 
warrantless search of the defendant’s home based on the officer hav-
ing entered to perform what the court categorized as “community 
caretaking functions.”114  Reacting to information that the defendant’s 
apartment door had been open all day and that the inside was in 
                                                                                                                           
 108 Ortiz, 24 So. 3d at 620 (Cohen, J., dissenting) (citing Michigan v. Tyler 436 U.S. 499, 504 
(1978)). 
 109 United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 112 (1984); see also Twilegar v. State, 42 So. 3d 
177 (Fla. 2010).  
 110 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31 (2001) (recognizing the right to be free from an 
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2003) (classifying the emergency aid exception as part of community caretaker doctrine); Troy v. 
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 112 Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441 (1973). 
 113 People v. Ray, 981 P.2d 928 (Cal. 1999).  
 114 Id. at 931. 
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shambles, officers went to Ray’s home.115  Upon arrival, there was con-
cern for the welfare of the people inside.116  Although they found no 
one inside the apartment, the officers did observe a large quantity of 
what was suspected to be cocaine.117  In response to the defendant’s 
motion to suppress, the prosecution attempted to justify the search 
based on the exigent circumstances exception.118  When the admissibil-
ity of the evidence ultimately came before the California Supreme 
Court, the State urged the court to affirm based on the emergency aid 
exception, “characterized as a variant of exigent circumstances.”119 
Applying the emergency aid exception requirements – that there 
must be “specific [articulate] facts indicating the need for swift action 
to prevent imminent danger to life” – the court held that such stan-
dards had not been met.120  However, rather than test the applicability 
of the exigent circumstance exception, or conclude their inquiry alto-
gether, the court submitted that the community caretaker doctrine 
existed for situations such as the present: “Under the community care-
taker exception, circumstances short of a perceived emergency may 
justify a warrantless entry . . . ‘where the police reasonably believe that 
the premises have recently been or are being burglarized.’”121  To enter 
a home on the belief that it has been, or is being burglarized, is pre-
cisely a police function related to a criminal activity.  If there actually 
had been an objective belief, based on the totality of the circum-
stances, that a crime was being committed inside the home, the search 
could have been justified under the exigent circumstances exception.122  
When first recognizing a community caretaker exception, the United 
States Supreme Court plainly stated that it was meant to be “totally 
divorced from the detection, investigation, or acquisition of evidence 
relating to the violation of a criminal statute.”123  If the officers had in 
fact needed to immediately enter the dwelling in order to either stop a 
crime or render medical aid, an already-existing exception could have 
provided them lawful entrance.  Conversely, if there truly was no im-
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 119 Id. at 932-33. 
 120 Id. at 934. 
 121 Id. (emphasis added) (quoting 3 LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE § 6.6(a), at 390 (3d ed. 
1996)). 
 122 Laney v. State, 117 S.W.3d 854, 861 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (stating that the exigent cir-
cumstances exception applies when police are acting in their crime-fighting roles).   
 123 Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441 (1973). 
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mediate threat, then the officers should have been required to obtain 
a warrant.    
Supporting this contention was the concurring opinion of Chief 
Justice George, who appropriately concluded that the search was law-
ful based instead on an application of the exigent circumstances ex-
ception.124  Citing to case precedent, the Chief Justice noted that exi-
gent circumstances include situations requiring swift action to prevent 
danger and preserve life.125  In the present case, based upon the police 
dispatch, the condition of the home, and the officer’s own experience, 
there was reasonable belief that exigent circumstances were present.126     
Finally, in his dissent, Judge Mosk recognized that the majority 
was creating a broad new exception, and, in doing so, obscured the line 
at the entrance to the home that the Fourth Amendment had con-
structed: 
Under the . . . newly created exception, entry is permissible, and 
incriminating evidence can be seized, when police officers enter a 
home merely to ‘find out what is going on’ . . . . Does the lead 
opinion’s new exception also permit entry when a door is merely 
unlocked?  When a neighbor reports that no one is home, or the 
occupants simply choose not to answer a knock at the door?127   
Given that the test for the community caretaker exception is “unteth-
ered,” the potential for abuse is great.128  Allowing officers to conduct 
warrantless home searches, absent an immediate threat to the occu-
pants, would be to create an exception that would swallow the general 
rule of security and privacy.129  Ultimately, Judge Mosk did not share in 
the majority’s belief that law enforcement assistance will “go down-
hill” without recognition of a new exception.130 
The confusion over when to apply exigent circumstances can also 
be seen in State v. Alexander.131  In Alexander, officers entered a home 
under the mistaken belief that a breaking and entering was in pro-
gress, and discovered marijuana.132  Like its California counterpart in 
Ray, the Maryland Court of Special Appeals mistakenly found that 
“what the officers did . . . was the quintessence of the reasonable per-
                                                                                                                           
 124 Ray, 981 P.2d at 940 (George, J., concurring). 
 125 Id. 
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formance of their community caretaking function.”133  In light of the 
above facts, it is clear that the community caretaker exception was 
inappropriately applied in this case for two reasons.  First, investigat-
ing what is believed to be an ongoing breaking and entering is not 
devoid from the prevention or detection of crime.  It is exactly what 
the exigent circumstances exception was created to address.134  Second, 
although rendering assistance to people in need is a function that a 
police officer undertakes to care for the community, it is not the type 
of function that the community caretaker doctrine originally encom-
passed.135 
The community caretaker doctrine has not only been expanded 
based on what truly equates to be exigent circumstances; rather, there 
has also been considerable misapplication when it comes to the ren-
dering of emergency aid.  In Troy v. Ohlinger, an officer was dis-
patched to the home of the defendant based on what was reported as 
an “injury accident.”136  A bystander told the officer that he heard a 
crash and saw a car being driven away by a man who appeared to be 
injured.137  The vehicle was found parked outside of the defendant’s 
home, appearing as though it had recently been involved in an acci-
dent.138  After knocking on the door and receiving no response, the 
officer shined his flashlight inside a window and witnessed the defen-
dant lying motionless and bleeding.139  After the officer entered the 
home and awoke the defendant, the defendant was charged with “op-
erating a motor vehicle while under the influence . . . and leaving the 
scene of a personal injury.”140 
In ruling that the officer was justified to enter the home without a 
warrant, the court declared that “the inability to determine, without 
entry, whether [the defendant] was injured, justified further police 
investigation as part of the community caretaker function.”141  What is 
troubling is that the court specifically cites to Mincey, the first Su-
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preme Court case to explicitly acknowledge an emergency aid excep-
tion, as validating the warrantless entry.142  If the court recognized that 
the officer entered the dwelling under the belief that the defendant 
was in need of immediate aid, why not simply state that the emer-
gency aid exception applied?  Granted, the rendering of emergency 
aid can arguably be viewed as a community caretaker function in that 
it is divorced from criminal purpose.143  Nevertheless, if the home is 
given the greatest Fourth Amendment protection, the court would 
have been better served to apply a more appropriate exception – the 
emergency aid doctrine.  Examining the objective reasonableness of 
the officer’s belief in a medical emergency, it is clear that the require-
ments of the emergency aid exception were satisfied: the car parked 
outside the home appeared as though it had been in a recent accident, 
and the defendant was bleeding and unconscious.144  All evidence 
pointed to an objective belief that the defendant was in need of im-
mediate aid.145  The inherent danger in this type of misdiagnosis of ex-
ceptions is the unnecessary encroachment upon Fourth Amendment 
rights.  Both the emergency aid and exigent circumstance exceptions 
are well-established in nature and require a specific set of circum-
stances. 146  As a result, they are less open to extension and are not 
untethered in nature.   
In jurisdictions where the community caretaker doctrine has not 
been extended, “courts have turned to language in Cady emphasizing 
the constitutional difference between the expectation of privacy in 
cars and homes.”147  In United States v. Erikson, the Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals made the determination that Cady did not extend to 
the home.148  In that case, the government argued that when an officer 
looked inside the defendant’s home, the search was protected under 
the community caretaker doctrine since there was a belief that a bur-
                                                                                                                           
 142 Id. at 56.  Mincey v. Arizona was the first Supreme Court case to officially recognize a 
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glary might have occurred.149  In reaching its determination that the 
community caretaker exception was not applicable, the court analyzed 
the language in Cady:  “Although it involved a community caretaking 
function, Cady clearly turned on the ‘constitutional difference’ be-
tween searching a house and searching an automobile.  In upholding 
the search of Cady's automobile, the Court expressly relied on its 
‘previous recognition of the distinction between motor vehicles and 
dwelling places.’”150  The court did recognize that in order for police 
officers to perform their crime fighting functions, privacy interests 
must sometimes be balanced.151  Nevertheless, “the exigent circum-
stances exception . . . adequately accommodates these competing in-
terests.”152 
Similar reliance on the express language in Cady can be found in 
U.S. v. Pichany.153  In Pichany, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals 
held that the search of the defendant’s unlocked warehouse by offi-
cers who were not investigating an ongoing crime could not be justi-
fied under the community caretaker exception.154  “Accepting the gov-
ernment's argument would require us to ignore express language in 
the Cady decision confining the ‘community caretaker’ exception to 
searches involving automobiles.”155 
One of the best cases in terms of articulating the different Fourth 
Amendment exceptions, while limiting Cady, is the Michigan case of 
People v. Davis.156  In Davis, police officers received a radio dispatch 
saying that shots had been fired at a motel.157  After entering the de-
fendant’s motel room based upon the belief that the defendant was in 
danger, the officers seized a gun as well as narcotics.158  The court of 
appeals upheld the search based on the community caretaker excep-
tion.159   
In reversing the decision of the lower court, the Michigan Su-
preme Court began by examining the emergency aid exception.160  The 
decision methodically showed how other courts had used “articulate 
standards[,] specifically applicable to emergency aid entries[,]” to 
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judge whether the search was lawful.161  A common feature was that 
police officers had to possess a reasonable belief that such circum-
stances existed.162  On the other hand, Cady did not list the standard of 
suspicion necessary to search protected areas under the community 
caretaker exception:  “[t]he [Cady] Court’s opinion suggested that 
because the police were not looking for any evidence of a crime, they 
needed no suspicion . . . to ‘search.’”163  Since the emergency aid excep-
tion contains the carefully-delineated standard of reasonable suspi-
cion, “when the police are investigating a situation in which they rea-
sonably believe someone is in need of immediate aid, their actions 
should be governed by the emergency aid doctrine, regardless of 
whether these actions can also be classified as community caretaking 
activities.”164  The reason for this conclusion is that the levels of privacy 
intrusion between an automobile and a home are dissimilar.165  It is 
because the home receives considerable protection that courts have 
seen fit to articulate standards specifically applicable to emergency aid 
entries.166  Given that these pronounced standards serve to protect the 
fabric of the Fourth Amendment, courts should not seek to apply a 
less germane exception whose lack of standard and clear boundaries 
create an exception that could arguably erode the Fourth Amend-
ment. 
Most importantly, the overarching theme in the cases refusing to 
extend the community caretaker doctrine is the recognition that the 
Supreme Court carefully considered the differences in constitutional 
privacy expectations between an automobile and a home.167  In doing 
so, the Court had the opportunity to extend the doctrine beyond vehi-
cles, yet decided otherwise.  Moreover, there is the acknowledgment 
that when the community caretaker doctrine is applied, instead of a 
more applicable, already-existing exception, searches are more prone 
to abuse in that caretaking can simply become a pretext for criminal 
investigations.168 
Although the Eleventh Circuit has yet to expressly rule on the 
boundaries of the community caretaker exception, Florida courts can 
infer from the ruling in U.S. v. McGough that the federal court disfa-
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vors expansion.169  In McGough, the defendant locked his five-year-old 
daughter, Queenice, in his apartment while he ran an errand.170  After 
the daughter mistakenly called 911, the police arrived on the scene.171  
Upon the defendant’s return, he was arrested for reckless conduct and 
placed in a police car.172  While waiting for her aunt to arrive, Queenice 
was asked by an officer if she would enter the apartment to gather 
some shoes and clothing.173  After Queenice stated that she was “too 
scared to go in by herself,” an officer picked her up and accompanied 
her into the apartment.174  While inside, the officer saw what appeared 
to be drugs and a revolver.175  “Queenice pointed to the gun and said 
‘that’s the gun my father uses to kill people.’”176  At trial, McGough 
argued that the search had been illegal and filed a motion to sup-
press.177  The government contended that the search was valid since the 
officer initially entered the apartment to perform a community care-
taking function.178 
Addressing the argument, the court noted that it has “never ex-
plicitly held that the community caretaking functions of a police offi-
cer [permitted] the warrantless entry into a private home.”179  In as-
suming for the sake of the appeal that there was such an exception, 
the court still found that the facts in this case did not justify its appli-
cation.180  When the apartment was searched, McGough was in custody 
and Queenice was safe; there was no immediate threat.  “Were we to 
apply the community caretaking exception in this case, we would un-
dermine the Amendment’s most fundamental premise: searches inside 
the home, without a warrant, are presumptively unreasonable.”181 
V.  THE COMMUNITY CARETAKER DOCTRINE IN FLORIDA  
Florida cases directly addressing the community caretaker doc-
trine are limited.  Until recently, Florida courts acknowledged the ex-
istence of the exception, yet none were willing to apply it to the 
                                                                                                                           
 169 United States v. McGough, 412 F.3d 1232, 1238 (11th Cir. 2005) (recognizing that com-
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home.182  However, in upholding a warrantless entry initiated to re-
unite a child with his parents in Ortiz v. State, the Fifth District Court 
of Appeal has in effect extended the community caretaker excep-
tion.183  In addition, Ortiz leaves the impression that confusion over the 
borders of the community caretaker doctrine, as well as its relation to 
previously-mentioned exceptions, still exists.184  However, before dis-
cussing Ortiz, it is important to first outline the history of the commu-
nity caretaker doctrine within the State. 
A. Historical Evolution 
In Florida, Cobb v. State was the first case to recognize the com-
munity caretaker doctrine.185  In upholding the warrantless search of a 
vehicle, the court turned to the language of Cady:  “Officer Thomas’ 
actions plainly constituted a part of what the Supreme Court charac-
terized . . . as the community caretaking functions.”186  “[T]he officer 
opened the [car] door, not in order to search . . . but rather [to secure] 
the vehicle against theft, vandals, and the elements . . . .”187  Nowhere in 
Cobb was it stated or implied that Cady searches could be applied to 
the home.  Although Florida courts eventually broadened the excep-
tion to encompass boats, this is arguably of no consequence since 
boats and cars are both ambulatory and come into frequent contact 
with the public.188  
The closest Florida has come to considering the adoption of a 
warrantless residential search, premised on the community caretaker 
doctrine, was in Riggs v. State.189  In Riggs, sheriff’s deputies were 
summoned to an apartment complex after a four-year-old girl had 
been spotted wandering naked and alone.190  Motivated by concern 
over the parents’ welfare, as well as the possibility of child abandon-
ment, the deputies searched the complex door to door.191  The deputies 
noticed that every door on the second floor was closed, except for 
one.192  Despite knocking loudly and identifying themselves as police, 
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no one inside the apartment came to the door.193  “Concerned that 
something had happened to the child’s caregiver and that maybe there 
was a medical concern . . . the deputies entered the apartment.”194  Af-
ter entering the apartment, the deputies discovered marijuana along 
with the petitioner, Riggs.195 
At trial, Riggs moved to suppress the evidence, stating it was the 
fruit of an unreasonable search.196  The State argued that the search 
was justified under exigent circumstances, yet the court was not per-
suaded by reason of the fact that the child was already safe.197  The 
Second District Court of Appeal reversed and held that the search 
was lawful under the reasonable belief that the child’s caregiver was 
experiencing an emergency.198 
Upon review, the Florida Supreme Court acknowledged that cer-
tain courts had cited Cady199 as supporting a medical emergency excep-
tion.200  Even so, the court was not persuaded to adopt such an ap-
proach, and instead upheld the warrantless search based on the equiv-
alent of the emergency aid exception: “We do not rely on Cady . . . be-
cause the Court’s analysis was expressly limited to the automobile con-
text.”201  With this statement, the court unequivocally chose not to ex-
pand the community caretaker doctrine beyond the context set forth 
in Cady. 
B. Ortiz v. State 
Of late, the Fifth District Court of Appeal has unofficially revital-
ized the community caretaker debate by issuing an opinion that at-
tempted to “[flesh] out the border[] of both the ‘feared medical emer-
gency’ exception . . . and the now well-recognized community caretak-
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ing function of police officers.”202  In Ortiz, a deputy received a call 
from an elementary school after a six-year-old’s parents failed to pick 
him up and could not be reached by telephone.203  Following standard 
policy procedure, the deputy drove the child to the child’s home in an 
effort to take reasonable steps to contact the parents before involving 
the Department of Children and Families.204  The child told the deputy 
that his parents “were or should be home.”205  In spite of this, no one 
appeared to be home, there were no cars in the driveway, and there 
were no signs of forced entry.206  The child received no response when 
he knocked on the front door.  However, the garage door was un-
locked, and the child opened it, possibly with help from the deputy.207 
Once inside the garage, the deputy could see a light on in the 
house and entered after being invited in by the child.208  Upon entering, 
he announced his presence but received no response.209  Finding no 
one inside, the child took the deputy to the parent’s bedroom where 
the door was locked from the inside.210  After knocking, announcing his 
presence, and still receiving no answer, the deputy became concerned 
for the well-being of the parents.211  Upon unlocking the door and en-
tering the bedroom, the deputy began to look for a body, but instead 
found cocaine in the bathroom.212  Ortiz then entered the room and 
after admitting that the cocaine was his, was arrested on drug-related 
charges.213  At trial, Ortiz moved to suppress the evidence, contending 
that exigent circumstances did not justify entry into the locked bed-
room.214 
In the original panel’s decision, the majority maintained that un-
like Riggs, the State had failed to demonstrate a reasonable belief that 
the child’s parents were inside the house and in need of medical atten-
tion.215  When the deputy arrived at the home, there were no cars in the 
driveway and no evidence of foul play.216  Concern for the well-being 
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of the parents only materialized after the deputy entered the home 
and found the locked bedroom.217  “‘[G]ood intentions notwithstand-
ing, the deputy lacked a reasonable basis to believe that a grave emer-
gency existed . . . .”218  As there was no exigency demonstrating a justi-
fied warrantless entry, 219 the majority sought to reverse Ortiz’s convic-
tion.220 
It was within the original dissent, authored by Judge Monaco, that 
the community caretaker doctrine was first incorporated into the case:  
“In my perspective Florida has already joined the growing number of 
courts that recognize that community caretaker function of police of-
ficers, or its functional equivalent, the exigent circumstances doctrine . 
. . .”221  Judge Monaco acknowledged that Riggs had limited Cady to 
automobiles, yet he nevertheless found the majority’s view of the po-
lice officer’s actions to be overly restrictive.222  In his opinion, not only 
was this case analogous to Riggs where the court had allowed a war-
rantless entry to contend with a feared emergency, but also, the Fourth 
Amendment was not intended to prevent “humanitarian activity” as 
evidenced by the existence of exigent and emergency exceptions.223  
Ultimately, Ortiz’s conviction was affirmed when the case was heard 
en banc.224   
The decision to hear the case en banc was founded on the belief 
that the original decision had a potential negative effect on the actions 
of law enforcement officials.225  Judge Monaco, whose original dissent 
became the majority opinion, once again, cited to Cady for its recogni-
tion that police officers perform caretaking functions.226  In addition, 
an attempt was made to classify the emergency aid exception as a 
progeny of the community caretaker exception.227  However, both of 
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the cases referred to as supporting this statement merely cited to Min-
cey as the genesis of this contention.228  As previously noted, Mincey 
simply recognized that a search during an ongoing emergency did not 
require a warrant.229  There was never any mention made of an emer-
gency aid exception derived from the principles expressed in Cady.230 
In determining that the emergency exception used in Riggs ap-
plied in this instance, the Ortiz majority sought to answer one ques-
tion: “[w]hether the officer had reasonable grounds to believe that the 
child’s parents might be in need of medical attention.”231  The answer 
to this inquiry was debatable and ultimately split the court.  In the 
opinion of the majority, the officer could have reasonably concluded 
that something was wrong given that (1) the child indicated that his 
parents were inside; (2) once inside the garage, the officer noticed a 
light on in the house as though someone was home; (3) upon reaching 
the master bedroom, the officer noticed the door was locked from the 
inside, and (4) the parents were currently an hour and a half late in 
picking their child up from school.232   
In contrast, the dissenting opinion authored by Judge Orfinger 
underscores the principle that when the government seeks to invoke a 
Fourth Amendment exception, it has the burden of rebutting the pre-
sumption of unreasonableness.233  It was his belief that the government 
failed to demonstrate a grave emergency that would make a war-
rantless search imperative to the safety of the police and of the com-
munity.234  Prior to the entry of the home, there was no evidence of foul 
play, no car was present in the driveway, and the house appeared to be 
empty.235  In short, there was no objective evidence pointing to an 
emergency inside the Ortiz residence. 
When analyzing Ortiz, the first question that should be asked is, 
considering the evidence, was the officer’s search of the home consti-
tutional under an emergency aid exception analysis?  The reason that 
an inquiry into the legality of the search should begin with the emer-
gency aid doctrine is that it was the exception applied in Riggs.236  If 
                                                                                                                           
 228 See United States v. Russell, 436 F.3d 1086, 1090 (9th Cir. 2006) (recognizing the emer-
gency aid doctrine as deriving from the holding in Mincey v. Arizona); see also United States v. 
Bradley, 321 F.3d 1212, 1214 (9th Cir. 2003) (referencing Mincey v. Arizona as the first case to 
recognize the emergency aid doctrine). 
 229 See Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 392-93 (1978). 
 230 Id.  
 231 Ortiz, 24 So. 3d at 602. 
 232 Id. at 602-03. 
 233 Id. at 610 (Orfinger, J., dissenting). 
 234 Id. at 611, 613 (citing McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 456 (1948)). 
 235 Id. at 613. 
 236 Riggs v. State, 918 So. 2d 274 (Fla. 2005). 
378 FIU Law Review [6:351 
the majority construes Ortiz and Riggs to be sufficiently similar, then 
it should follow that both satisfy the emergency aid exception.237  
In reviewing whether it appeared as though an ongoing emer-
gency existed inside the home, the facts must be assessed objectively.238  
“As a general rule, the reasonableness of an officer’s conduct [de-
pends] upon the existence of facts available to him at the moment of 
the search . . . .”239  When the officer began to open the garage door, he 
had seen no lights on within the house and had not yet discovered the 
locked bedroom door.240  The only evidence of a potential ongoing 
emergency within the house was a six-year-old’s belief that his parents 
were inside.241  Conversely, the officers in Riggs were confronted with a 
situation that was considerably more attuned to the purpose of the 
emergency aid doctrine.  Before initiating a search, the officers had 
found a child wandering naked and alone, a lighted apartment whose 
door was open as though someone had come out, and had received no 
response from their knocks.242  Truly, the situation indicated that the 
welfare of the child’s parents might be in question.  Unlike in Riggs, in 
Ortiz, the objective circumstances existing at the time of the search 
simply did not provide a basis to believe that there could have been an 
ongoing emergency.243  In Riggs, because the deputies were 
“[c]oncerned that ‘something had happened to the child’s caregiver 
and that maybe there was a medical concern in there,’ they entered 
the apartment.”244  In Ortiz, the officer testified that he went into the 
home, not because of a perceived emergency, but because he sought to 
reunite the child with his parents.245  Hence, these two cases are dis-
similar. 
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The next question becomes, if the emergency aid exception was 
not applicable, could the search have been justified based on nothing 
more than the reasonableness of the officer’s desire to provide the 
community caretaking service of reunification?  Although the major-
ity never expressly stated that the search should be upheld based on 
an exception aside from rendering emergency aid, this contention is 
implicit within the opinion: “The officer was fulfilling a laudable police 
function in attempting to reunite the child with his missing parents . . . 
We give weight to the fact that a proper function of the officer . . . was 
to attempt to reunite the child with his parents . . . .”246  This statement, 
coupled with the officer’s testimony that he sought to bring about re-
unification, suggests that the initial phase of the search was based 
solely on the officer’s community caretaker role.247  Given that Florida 
has never allowed the community caretaker doctrine to allow for a 
warrantless search of a home, the search is not justifiable under this 
exception either.248  In reaching this conclusion, it is important to recall 
the reasons certain jurisdictions improperly extend Cady into the 
home.  
Improper extension of the community caretaker doctrine occurs 
for two reasons: (1) failure to apply already-recognized, more suitable 
exceptions and (2) disregard for the language in Cady that expressly 
limited the exception to automobiles.249  The majority in Ortiz makes 
both of these errors.  Turning to the first mistake, instead of strictly 
analyzing the search under the emergency aid exception, the court 
construes the doctrine to be a part of the community caretaker excep-
tion, essentially advocating that the search was lawful both because 
there was an ongoing emergency and because of the community care-
taking function of reunification.250   
By emphasizing the police officer’s attempt to reunify the child 
with his parents, it appears as though the majority intuitively recog-
nized that the objective reasonableness of rendering aid was not 
enough, by itself, to overcome the warrant requirement.251  In order to 
not hinder officers from performing their caretaking functions, the 
majority reaches an interesting conclusion placed in context by the 
following quote: “The issue always is a comparison of the harm done 
by a marginal curtailment of one value with the benefit to another 
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value from the curtailment.”252  According to the court, “the benefit 
obtained by allowing officers to act without a warrant in perceived 
emergency situations must trump the marginal curtailment of the war-
rant requirement.”253  In spite of this belief, allowing warrantless entry 
into the home to perform caretaking functions is anything but a mar-
ginal curtailment.  In effect, it is the creation of a broad and unre-
stricted exception.   
The emergency aid doctrine has already been recognized in Flor-
ida and has clear-cut standards that exist to protect unnecessary en-
croachment upon Fourth Amendment rights.254  If the court truly 
wished to adhere to the decision in Riggs by applying a recognized 
exception to the warrant requirement, it would have examined the 
objective belief of an ongoing emergency at the time the officer en-
tered the garage.  In upholding a search where the entry was not pred-
icated on the desire to render emergency aid or medical assistance, the 
court endorsed the warrantless search of a home based on what was a 
perceived community caretaking function.  As previously mentioned, 
the danger with upholding a search anchored in caretaking principles 
is that the low standard of reasonability, absent delineated standards, 
erodes the constitutional line that protects the home from invasions of 
privacy.  
In justifying a community caretaker search, the only question that 
must be asked is, “[g]iven the known facts, would a prudent and rea-
sonable officer have perceived a need to act in the proper discharge of 
his or her community caretaking functions?”255  Such a low standard 
virtually guarantees access to the home whenever an officer perceives 
that entry would be in an individual’s best interest.  This broad excep-
tion unseats the settled ideal that the right of a man to retreat into his 
own home stands at the very core of the Fourth Amendment.256   
Without question, the majority’s holding would be strengthened 
if the community caretaker exception were to apply to the home.  In 
Judge Evander’s words, “If the community caretaker exception was 
found to be applicable to residences, then the State’s interest in seek-
ing prompt reunification . . . should be given significant weight . . . 
However, if the . . . exception is inapplicable, then . . . the State’s argu-
ment must fail.”257   
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According to Judge Torpy, author of one of the concurring opin-
ions, “Cady does not compel, and there is no logical basis for, a distinc-
tion between vehicles and residences for purposes of assessing 
whether police acted reasonably in conducting a noncriminal search 
under their caretaking function.”258  Essentially, there were two issues 
in Cady: whether the search was unreasonable solely because the offi-
cer lacked a warrant,259 and whether the search was otherwise unrea-
sonable under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.260  In Judge 
Torpy’s view, the distinction drawn between automobiles and homes 
was implemented simply to answer the first issue of unreasonableness 
absent a warrant.261  The second issue of reasonableness in light of the 
Fourth Amendment did not require a distinction between homes and 
automobiles since the court stated that “[t]he Framers . . . have given 
us only the general standard of ‘unreasonableness’ as a guide in de-
termining whether searches . . . meet the standard of that Amendment 
. . . where a warrant is not required.”262   
The problem with this reasoning is that the second issue (unrea-
sonableness within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment) is de-
pendent upon the first (unreasonableness absent a warrant).  In Cady, 
the general standard of “reasonableness” was implemented by the 
Court in view of the fact that a search of the trunk did not require a 
warrant.263  The only reason the search of the car did not require a war-
rant was that, unlike homes, cars are ambulatory in nature, and police 
officers often come into frequent noncriminal contact with them.264  
The distinction between cars and dwellings led to the search being 
lawful absent a warrant, which in turn led to the Court implementing a 
standard of overall reasonableness to answer the second inquiry.265  
Ultimately, the Florida Supreme Court interpreted Cady as expressly 
limiting the community caretaker exception to vehicles.266  As a result, 
the majority in Ortiz erred in giving weight to the officer’s attempt to 
reunite the child with his parents. 
But what about the need to balance our inclinations to have po-
lice officers perform caretaking functions against our need to be pro-
tected from warrantless searches?  As the majority underscored, “[we 
live] in a day and age where society expects police officers to be deep-
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ly involved in humanitarian and life . . . [and are expected to engage 
in] protecti[ve] actions that go beyond traditional law enforcement 
duties.”267  Even if the ideals expressed in Cady were not extended to 
the home, there would not be a “far-reaching negative effect” on law 
enforcement officials.    
Officers are still able to perform warrantless domestic searches 
when there is a true indication of an ongoing medical emergency or 
even ongoing criminal behavior as provided for by the exigent circum-
stances exception.  If the search in Ortiz could not be clearly justified 
by either of these existing exceptions, then perhaps the situation was 
not that of an ongoing emergency in which there was no time to se-
cure a warrant.  Even though the officer acted on what were clearly 
good-faith intentions, he always had the option of leaving the child 
with the Department of Children and Families until the house could 
be properly searched. 
Although the court had good intentions in affirming the decision 
by trying not to discourage police officers from undertaking humani-
tarian actions, it very well may have created a new Fourth Amend-
ment exception that allows for warrantless entry into the home when-
ever police reasonably believe that they are performing a community 
caretaking function.268  Such an exception is overly broad, open to 
abuse, and significantly infringes on the protection that homes are 
afforded under the Fourth Amendment.  In fact, Fourth Amendment 
rights would have been better served if the court analyzed the search 
under a strict application of the emergency aid doctrine, based on the 
objective belief that there was an ongoing emergency at the time the 
garage door was opened.  The emergency aid exception is well-
recognized and does not present a threat to the firm line drawn be-
tween the home and the government.   
Although an analysis of this type would not favor the majority’s 
view as much as one giving extra credence to an officer’s community 
caretaking functions, it nonetheless would have been more consistent 
with the Florida Supreme Court’s prior stance on the community care-
taker exception.269  As the case was decided, Ortiz indirectly goes 
against Florida precedent by allowing a warrantless search that was, at 
least in part, motivated and undertaken by actions that fall under the 
heading of a community caretaking function. 
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VI.  PROTECTING THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: FLORIDA SHOULD LIMIT 
THE COMMUNITY CARETAKER DOCTRINE TO AUTOMOBILES  
Protection of privacy against unwarranted intrusion remains the 
key function of the Fourth Amendment and should always be consid-
ered by Florida courts.270  Because there were no delineated standards 
of reasonableness or probable cause set forth in Cady, it stands to rea-
son that when police are not investigating criminal activity, their 
search is justified whenever they believe there is a danger that threat-
ens the well-being of the community.271  This opens the door to creating 
a sizeable warrant exception that could consume the general rule.  
When the Court first recognized caretaker functions, it also acknowl-
edged that there was a difference in privacy, based on contact with the 
general public, between a vehicle and a home.272  It is difficult to accept 
that the Court would have intentionally set such a low threshold for a 
new exception when it had previously stated that “physical entry of 
the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth 
Amendment is directed.”273   
Granted, there are exceptions to the Fourth Amendment recog-
nizing that certain searches promote a legitimate governmental inter-
est.274  However, these searches have carefully-delineated standards; 
both the exigent circumstances doctrine and the emergency aid doc-
trine require probable cause and good faith based on objective rea-
sonableness.275  Furthermore, they both apply in situations that are ex-
pressly limited in scope and thus pose no danger to become infinitely 
broad.276  As Ortiz v. State illustrates, judges will not always agree as to 
whether the standards for objective reasonableness within a certain 
exception have been satisfied.  Nevertheless, the basic requirements 
for doctrines such as the emergency aid doctrine remain identifiable 
and have been agreed upon by most courts.277  Such a claim is not 
available to the community caretaker doctrine.278   
                                                                                                                           
 270 See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966). 
 271 See generally Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973). 
 272 Cady, 413 U.S. at 441-42. 
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 274 See People v. Bennett, 949 P.2d 947, 955-56 (Cal. 1998). 
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Absent a more definitive interpretation of the community care-
taker doctrine from the United States Supreme Court, Florida courts 
should do their utmost to construe the exception in accordance with 
the Supreme Court’s construction.279  Although reasonable minds may 
differ as to what Cady specifically stood for,280 the Florida Supreme 
Court has explicitly stated that the caretaker analysis in Cady is lim-
ited to the automobile context.281  In keeping with the privacy interests 
of the Fourth Amendment, as well as the plain language of Cady and 
Riggs, Florida should continue to unite with other state and federal 
jurisdictions in resisting the temptation to expand the community 
caretaker doctrine.282  Already-existing Fourth Amendment exceptions 
serve the need to place human life above household privacy and rec-
ognize that there is not always an opportunity to obtain a warrant dur-
ing an ongoing emergency.283  If Florida allows yet another Fourth 
Amendment exception to exist, especially one as broad as the com-
munity caretaker doctrine, the State risks completely destroying a 
fundamental right whose sanctity has been recognized since well be-
fore the American Revolution.284  Such sacrifice of given rights is not 
justified in the name of “maximum simplicity.”285 
Unfortunately, when petitioned to hear Ortiz, the Florida Su-
preme Court declined jurisdiction.286  While this decision would imply 
that the court found no conflict between the holdings in Riggs and 
Ortiz, a valuable opportunity to ultimately correct the position that 
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the community caretaker exception was squandered.287  Even if there 
was no conflict between the two cases, the Florida Supreme Court has 
jurisdiction to review cases of great public importance.288  Although the 
court did address non-criminal Fourth Amendment exceptions in 
Riggs, its focus on the subject was brief, and the issue remains unre-
solved as evidenced by Ortiz.   
The court should have granted the motion for rehearing to state 
that, regardless of whether the officer in Ortiz had an objective reason 
to believe that an ongoing medical emergency was taking place, there 
would be no further expansion of the community caretaker exception.  
In other words, Riggs would remain the standard, regardless of the 
arguably dissimilar outcome in Ortiz.  As the law currently stands, 
Ortiz leaves the door open for further Fourth Amendment erosion 
because it implies that community caretaker functions authorize war-
rantless entry. 
As mentioned throughout this comment, much of the unneces-
sary extension from the community caretaker doctrine stems from 
confusion over which Fourth Amendment exception should be ap-
plied in any given situation.289  It is easy to hold the point of view that 
categorizing numerous exceptions under various headings is merely a 
matter of semantics.  After all, they stand for the same basic ideal that 
police should be able to enter a dwelling when they reasonably be-
lieve that an emergency exists.290  Nevertheless, when the standards for 
each recognized exception are met, the presumption that the search in 
question was unreasonable is rebutted.291  Conversely, when a new 
standard is created, such as a version of the community caretaking 
doctrine that extends to the home, there is no evidence that the pre-
sumption of unreasonableness is rebutted, especially since “for the 
purposes of the Fourth Amendment there is a constitutional differ-
ence between houses and cars.”292  Only by carefully delineating the 
various Fourth Amendment exceptions, and then holding that Cady is 
limited to automobiles, will the issue be properly settled. 
Although it may be tempting to widen Cady by labeling other ex-
ceptions under the broad heading of “community caretaking” duties, 
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this blurs the line unnecessarily.  While it may be an important gov-
ernmental and societal interest not to discourage police officers from 
performing those duties labeled as community caretaking functions,293 
there are already Fourth Amendment exceptions that serve this very 
purpose.294  No matter whether officers’ intentions are just or their ac-
tions are unrelated to crime-fighting, not every warrantless search 
should be considered lawful.  Florida courts must remember that 
physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the Fourth 
Amendment is directed, and should retain the policy that the commu-
nity caretaker doctrine does not extend beyond the scope of vehicles.295 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
By continuing to carve out Fourth Amendment exceptions and 
expand already-existing ones, courts do nothing more than erode the 
basic principles on which the Fourth Amendment was premised.  No 
matter how well-intentioned police officers may be, our society should 
not sacrifice fundamental rights in the name of simplicity.  As Justice 
Douglas once opined, the Fourth Amendment is for the innocent and 
guilty alike.296  If losing evidence is the price society pays for the free-
dom guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment, let us hope that the 
courts continue to view the Fourth Amendment as being worth that 
price.  To protect “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their . . . 
houses . . . against unreasonable searches and seizures,”297 Florida 
courts should interpret the community caretaker exception as it was 
intended – limited to automobile searches. 
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